search for funds; how they use those funds (including salaries and incentives for fighters); as well as the storage (often in cash) and management of funds (including the aforementioned issue of corruption). Mironova also pushes the boundaries of traditional understandings of terrorist and rebel group financing, arguing that some donors are in fact investors in rebel groups and expect returns on their investments. These interviews are rich primary source material and are a much-needed addition to fields of study that often rely on secondary sources.

While this book contributes to the fields mentioned above, the author only engages with them in a limited way. In order to gain as much insight as possible from this book, readers will need to situate it within existing debates in the literatures on rebel governance, civil war and terrorist financing. Likewise, the policy implications are largely limited to how to best exploit and support rebel groups. Savvy readers will immediately recognize that many more policy options can be mined from this research, particularly when combined with the existing literature.

Despite these minor limitations, this monograph makes a significant contribution to our understanding of rebel governance, terrorist financing, civil wars and international relations more broadly. It is required reading for anyone in these fields seeking to understand the internal operations of rebel groups, and particularly for those wishing to shape civil war outcomes and develop policy responses.

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Divided armies: inequality and battlefield performance in modern war. By Jason Lyall. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 2020. 508pp. £50.00. ISBN 978 0 69119 244 4. Available as e-book.

Divided armies is a ground-breaking work of social science and military history. Among many contributions, the book should have enduring influence on the study of international affairs for three reasons. First, by introducing the Project Mars dataset, Jason Lyall contributes mightily to addressing selection bias in the study of war, which has long focused on western states and armies. Replications, robustness tests and extensions of his work using his transparent and public data will enrich future research. Second, the exhaustive, multi-method analysis of the drivers of battlefield performance in modern war is innovative and enlightening—Lyall's connection of first-rate quantitative analysis with deep military history is unique. Finally, the finding that 'meaningful inclusion creates lethal armies; military inequality divides them, destroying them from within' (p. 431) should shape how scholars understand war, but also how states treat their citizens as a matter of national security.

Lyall starts with a straightforward but ambitious research question: 'what explains battlefield performance in modern war?' (p. 4). He makes a very convincing argument, supported by an impressive new dataset, rigorous quantitative work and detailed historical analysis. Greater inequality (the more an ethnic group suffered from prewar discrimination) leads to worse battlefield performance. This is both because marginalization dampens groups' willingness to fight for the regime doing

573

the marginalizing, and because the requirements to maintain discipline under such conditions create tactical and operational challenges that hinder performance.

While Lyall's arguments are grounded in existing theory, they are also quite original. He starts with the empirical observation, using his Project Mars dataset, that growing military inequality increases four types of negative battlefield outcomes: unfavourable loss–exchange ratios, mass desertion, mass defection and the use of 'blocking detachments' (p. 18) to prevent such behaviours. Lyall theorizes three causal mechanisms that result in the negative relationship between prewar inequality and battlefield performance: doubts among soldiers about regime legitimacy, low interethnic trust and the pervasiveness of intraethnic networks in response to mistreatment.

Lyall provides support for his argument in a four-step methodological progression. First, he uses a detailed historical analysis of the first and second Mahdi wars in a 'natural experiment' and theory-building exercise. The unexpected death of a leader committed to equality and his replacement with a leader who took the opposite approach serves as the experiment. Second, he conducts regression analyses using cross-national war-level data from the Project Mars dataset to test associations between military inequality and battlefield performance. Third, he uses a Neyman–Rubin matching approach to identify three pairs of highly similar belligerents differing primarily on inequality, which he then compares as 'treatments' and 'controls' in process-tracing chapters. These chapters are also fascinating histories of conflicts ranging from the Khanate of Kokand's war with Russia to the Democratic Republic of Congo's experience in the Second Congo War. Finally, Lyall tests his argument's explanatory power *within* armies, with two paired comparisons among Soviet Rifle Divisions during the 1941 battle of Moscow.

Divided armies, through its insight that belligerent states' domestic political management of diversity is predictive of battlefield performance, makes contributions across a number of areas of interest to political scientists, historians and policy-makers. First, it points to the importance of domestic institutions and political economies in the study of war and, ultimately, state formation: 'politics trump anarchy' (p. 416). Second, by identifying military inequality as a determinant of relative capabilities that is visible prior to combat, *Divided armies* may help mitigate uncertainty about those capabilities, which can itself lead to war. Finally—and perhaps most importantly—the findings challenge the notion that democracies are better at warfighting than non-democracies, which has important policy implications. A belief in such superiority in the context of Great Power rivalry could lead democracies to strategic and political complacency precisely at a moment when the order that preserved peace among their members is under great strain. Lyall's argument challenges democracies to improve inclusion as a matter of state survival.

Divided armies suggests three directions for future research. First, on the origins of military inequality: why do leaders choose to exclude? Inclusion is not necessarily a linear process and forms of backsliding are possible even in highly inclusive militaries. Moreover, while the book focuses on ethnic cleavages, ideological, class

and gender differences may be just as or more important in some societies. That persistent military inequality is related to domestic politics appears likely—Lyall suggests that additional country-level time series data would enable scholars to study within-case variation over time and shed light on choices to exclude. Second, further analysis is necessary at the level of military units to identify approaches for mitigating the effects of military inequality on battlefield performance. Data at this level could help test Lyall's argument in the context of irregular wars—an interesting proposition both because of the prevalence of such wars and because of what Lyall contends is a shortage of theoretical and empirical work linking conventional and irregular warfare. Finally, analysis of networks in which individual soldiers are nodes could help mitigate the deleterious effects of military inequality and build inclusive militaries that benefit from diversity and the construction of intra- and interethnic trust.

This kind of research could help inform predictive analyses of the likelihood and outcome of armed conflicts. Lyall points to the predictability of outcomes—see the Iraqi Army's early performance against Islamic State in Iraq and Syria—given an understanding of the damaging effects of military inequality, and the self-described blindness of US leaders to such predictions. Understanding the effects of inequality on military performance can also help shape reforms in militaries with relatively low inequality seeking to maintain the advantages conferred by that—ranging from managing technology like artificial intelligence and dealing with partner forces to supporting efforts at statebuilding.

Lyall makes the powerful argument that 'bigotry and racism are threats to national security' (p. 428). Because of this, an approach of radical inclusion in the US military, he argues, will provide significant battlefield advantages. Given the impressive data and analysis supporting Lyall's findings, this argument merits the attention and consideration of strategists, military leaders and defence policy-makers.

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The views expressed above are the author's alone, and do not reflect Army, Department of Defense, or US policy.

Measuring peace: principles, practices, and politics. By Richard Caplan. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2019. 176pp. £27.00. ISBN 978 0 19881 036 0. Available as e-book.

In *Measuring peace: principles, practices, and politics*, Richard Caplan aims to answer the question: 'How can we know if the peace that has been established following a civil war is stable?' (p. 1). In a book geared towards the policy-minded scholar or the academically inclined practitioner, Caplan takes readers on a journey clarifying important concepts such as conflict and peace, and identifying what the current major players in peacebuilding do in order to measure their efficacy.

Given the time, effort, money and the sheer importance of getting it right when it comes to peacebuilding, this book is a welcome and important addition

575